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GREGORY P. CRINION*

ARTICLES

Information Gathering on Tax Evasion
in Tax Haven Countries
I. Introduction
Since the mid-1950's the United States tax authorities and Congress

have increasingly concentrated on attacking international tax evasion in
tax haven countries.' Detecting and proving the tax evasion, however,
has been the major problem faced by the tax authorities. 2 Information on
the existence, ownership, and value of deposit accounts in tax haven
countries has proven extremely difficult to obtain. 3 This is due, in part,
to the fact that foreign financial institutions are not subject to the same
disclosure requirements as are American financial institutions. Thus, U.S.
tax authorities do not have the same ready access to tax information held
in the foreign country as they do to information held by institutions in
the United States. Another factor in the U.S. tax authorities' inability to
*Attorney, Exxon Company, U.S.A.; B.B.A., University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire: M.B.A.,
University of Minnesota; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School. The views and opinions
expressed herein are solely those of the author and not necessarily those of the author's
employer.
I. Tax Evasion Through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1983) (statement of William J. Anderson, Director, General Government
Division, General Accounting Office) [hereinafter referred to as Netherlands Antilles Hearings]. STAFF OF
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obtain necessary information is that the other principal source of the
information is the tax haven government. 4 The tax haven government
generally fails to provide the requested information either because it does
not compile that information, 5 because its bank and commercial secrecy
laws prohibit disclosure of that information, 6 or because it does not have
any agreement with the United States authorizing the release of that
7
information.
The inability of the U.S. tax authorities to obtain even minimal information on tax haven activities precludes any realistic estimate of the
magnitude of the tax evasion problem. 8 The U.S. tax authorities are unable
to make a reliable estimate since they do not have information on the
amounts transferred into or through tax havens, the source and ownership
of those funds, or the extent to which those funds are merely being laundered through the tax haven countries. 9 While the tax authorities contin4. Given that the taxpayer will obviously not voluntarily disclose the necessary information and the foreign financial institutions are not subject to U.S. reporting laws, this
leaves the tax haven government as the only possible source. This assumes that where the
domestic tax haven laws do not require routine domestic financial institution reporting, the
tax haven government could compel disclosure of the information in specific instances.
5. GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 169.
6. Id. For a discussion of the Swiss banking secrecy laws see, Meyer, Swiss Banking
Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 18 (1978)
and Honegger, Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and Illmnination ofthe United
States-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C.J. INT'L L. AND COM. REG. I (1983).
Reprints, translations, and summaries of bank secrecy laws in several tax haven countries
may be found in SENATE STAFF STUDY, supra note I and in TAX HAVEN INFORMATION
BOOK, Department of the Treasury, IRS, Doc. 6743 (1982). In general, the bank secrecy
laws require that banks maintain absolute confidentiality regarding their client's accounts
and transactions except where disclosure is required, as in criminal investigations by the
domestic government. Violation of the secrecy laws typically subjects the violator to civil
and criminal sanctions.
7. "It is an established principle of international law that a country is not obligated to
assist in the enforcement of the penal or tax laws of another country in the absence of an
applicable treaty or bilateral agreement." Senate Hearings, supra note 2 at 38 (statement
of John M. Walker, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Enforcement, Department of the Treasury).
See, Gordon Report, supra note 3 at 9 and Netherlands Antilles Hearings, supra note I at
232-33 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., commissioner, IRS).
8. A study was conducted by the Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter referred to as
IRS] for the purpose of estimating the levels of tax haven usage. While data was compiled
regarding general tax haven usage, the report from the study stated that given the multiple
veils of secrecy, no estimate could be made of either the size of U.S. owned funds hidden
from tax authorities or the amounts by which those funds increase year by year. GORDON,
ESTIMATES OF LEVELS OF TAX HAVEN USE: A STUDY TO QUANTIFY THE USE OF TAX
HAVENS, TAX HAVEN STUDY GROUP, IRS 26 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as EsTIMATES
OF LEVELS OF TAX HAVEN USE].

Another problem incurred in the estimation of tax haven usage is defining which countries
are tax havens. There is no agreed upon list of tax haven countries. SENATE STAFF STUDY,
supra note I at 10; GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 40-41 and 177; Tax Havens in the
Caribbean Basin, Department of the Treasury 3-4 (1984); and Irish, 7ax Havens, 15 VAND.

J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449, 452 n.5 (1982).
9. GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 36.
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ually assert that tax evasion is a serious problem, 10 the IRS has been able
only to estimate that the tax loss due to tax evasion in tax haven countries
amounts to many billions of dollars. I1
A statistical analysis provides some insight into the potential magnitude
of international tax evasion activities.' 2 Table 1 (subhead A) compares
the foreign asset holdings of banks in selected countries to merchandise
exports for those countries. 13 This ratio (which is generally considered
an indicator of a country's functioning as a tax haven) illustrates the extent
to which a country is holding foreign assets in excess of the amount needed
to finance its foreign trade. 14
Four of the five Caribbean tax haven countries listed (the Bahamas,
Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and Panama) have consistently held foreign assets far in excess of their merchandise exports and far above the
average for all non-oil producing developing countries. 15 The fifth country, the Netherlands Antilles, is an exception, but its excess asset holdings are increasing at a much faster rate than those of the other Caribbean tax haven countries. 16 The second part of Table I (subhead B)
is a comparison in absolute terms of foreign assets held by Caribbean
tax haven countries to the holdings of all non-oil producing developing
countries. The principal holders of excess foreign assets in the Caribbean
are the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and Panama. Together they hold
over $300 billion in excess foreign assets. 17 Even if only a small percentage of this excess represents tax evasion activity, the tax revenue
loss is substantial.
The United States tax authorities have been attacking these tax evasion
efforts through both civil and criminal enforcement methods. 18 As of
February 1983, at least 126 cases involving bank or commercial secrecy
were pending in U.S. courts. 19 These cases involved laundering or secreting illegal profits, secreting legitimate assets for illegitimate purposes,
20
and using offshore entities as an integral part of an overall crime scheme.
10. Id. at 3; Tax Havens in the Caribbean Basin, note 8 supra at 3; and, Senate Hearings,
supra note 2 at 15.
11. Senate Hearings, supra note 2 at 15, Netherlands Antilles Hearings, supra note I at
224 and 239 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., IRS Commissioner), and Wall St. J., Oct.
10, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
12. For a detailed statistical analysis measuring the use of tax havens, see generally,
ESTIMATES OF LEVELS OF TAX HAVEN USE, supra note 8.
13. Tax Havens in the Caribbean Basin, supra note 8 at 13.
14. Id. at 12.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Senate Hearings, supra note 2 at 20 and 259.
19. Id. and SENATE STAFF STUDY, supra note 1 at 146-159.
20. Id.
FALL 1986
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TABLE I
Foreign Assets of Deposit Banks
1978-1982
1978

A.

1982

Ratio of Foreign Assets to
Merchandise Exports
World

0.87

0.85

Industrial Countries

0.90

0.99

1.45

Oil-Producing Developing Countries

0.10

0.10

0.22

Non-Oil Developing Countries

1.27

1.00

1.73

46.20
32.75

24.47
57.00

36.42,
108.33'

i
1.06

1.90

61.96
0.74

91.64
0.79

114.30
1.72

94.8
1.3
49.0

11.4
2.2
84.5

134.6'
3.2e
127.7

Selected Caribbean Countries
Bahamas
Bermuda
Cayman Islands
Netherlands Antilles
Panama
United States
B.

1980

i

1.34

i
3.90,

Foreign Assets Above or Below
the Average Level
($ billions)
Selected Caribbean Countries
in Relation to Average for
All Non-Oil Developing Countries
Bahamas
Bermuda
Cayman Islands
Netherlands Antilles
Panama
Total Five Countries
United States in Relation to Average
for All Industrial Countries

-0.6

3.0

6.0'

16.4

32.6

41.4

160.9

123.7

312.9

22.8

-24.7

56.8

'Estimate.
iSince merchandise exports are negligible, the ratio approaches infinity.

The Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Switzerland, Panama, Luxembourg,
Costa Rica, and Liechtenstein were a few of the tax haven countries
involved. 2 1 In January 1984, the IRS identified 464 criminal tax cases
involving the Caribbean Basin area alone from the period January 1978
to August 1983.22 At that time, the government was actively investigating
21. Id.
22. Tax Havens in the Caribbean Basin, supra note 8 at 34.
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130 of these cases and had recommended prosecution in 153 cases. In 81
cases, successful prosecution resulted in an increase in the average taxable
income for each case of about $1.7 million. One hundred cases had been
discontinued or dismissed for a variety of reasons,
including the inability
23
to obtain information from tax haven countries.
The United States has also pursued a policy of terminating or
renegotiating certain bilateral tax treaties because of the risk of treaty
shopping and banking and commercial secrecy abuses. 24 In July 1983,
the Treasury announced that it was terminating tax treaties with a
number of countries, including Anguilla, Barbados, Belize, Dominica,
Grenada, Montserrat, St. Christoper-Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent
and the Grenadines. 25 At about the same time, the Treasury announced that Antigua and Barbuda cancelled their treaty with the
United States. 26 In addition, the treaty negotiations with the British
Virgin Islands regarding the amendment of an existing income tax
treaty were cancelled and the existing treaty terminated. Negotiations
with the Netherlands Antilles on a new income tax treaty are
27
continuing.
The basic prerequisite for successful tax enforcement efforts is the
compilation of information on taxpayer activities. An information exchange under existing bilateral tax treaties is one traditional information
gathering method. Historically, the U.S. tax authorities, however, have
not been successful in obtaining sufficient information through traditional
methods. It is non-traditional, ad hoc methods which have uncovered the
most valuable information for fighting tax evasion activities in tax haven
countries. Nonetheless, new and expanded exchange of information agreements and multilateral investigation procedures may prove more successful in the future.
This article examines several of the information gathering procedures
utilized by the U.S. tax authorities to combat the tax evasion problem.
Part II of this article examines unilateral methods of the U.S. tax authorities to obtain information on tax evasion. Such methods include IRS
administrative summonses and the grand jury subpoena, the use of IRS
23. Id. at 34-35. See Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 5, for statistics on IRS criminal
investigations into money laundering activities alone.
24. Id. at 44. The Treasury Department also indicated that it is Treasury policy not to
enter into any new treaties which would allow the unwarranted extension of benefits to
residents of third countries. The objective of this policy is to limit treaty shopping, to expand
and improve the U.S. treaty network by precluding third country residents from obtaining
the benefits of a bilateral tax treaty without actually entering into one, and to encourage
adherence to the letter and spirit of the law. Id. at 44-45.
25. Treasury News, 20 TAX NOTES 175 (1983).
26. Id.

27. Tax Havens in the Caribbean Basin, supra note 8 at 46.
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paid informants, and exclusive IRS investigations such as mail watches,
employment of foreign revenue service representatives, and passive gathering of public information. Part III of this article examines the use of
existing IRS reporting requirements as information gathering tools, while
Part IV analyzes the involvement of the judiciary in the United States
and the foreign country in the information gathering process through the
use of letters rogatory. Part V discusses the U.S. tax authorities' bilateral
efforts to discover information on tax evasion. These efforts include bilateral tax treaties, exchange of information agreements, simultaneous
examination procedures, and the United States-Switzerland Mutual Assistance Treaty. Finally, Part VI discusses additional information gathering
methods that will likely be utilized in the future, including the SwitzerlandUnited States Memorandum of Understanding and multilateral tax treaties, the possibilities of which are presently being discussed by the United
States and other countries.
This article concludes that the U.S. tax authorities are determined to
combat the tax evasion problem and are willing to go to great lengths
to do so. The U.S. tax authorities have been aggressive in their pursuit
of tax evaders, and past efforts are evidence that the tax authorities
have not hesitated to utilize domestic and foreign laws to their limits.
It is very likely that the tax authorities will continue their aggressive
posture against tax evasion and that they will continue to devise newer,
more intrusive, and even more effective procedures to fight the tax
evasion problem.
II. Unilateral IRS Information Gathering Methods
The U.S. tax authorities have achieved the greatest successes in obtaining information on the illegal use of tax havens through unilateral IRS
action. Likely reasons for the success of these efforts are as follows:
First, the tax authorities were not obliged to depend on foreign governments which may be reluctant to render assistance due to their own
conflicting policies and laws. 28 Second, the U.S. tax authorities have
innovatively applied existing law to new circumstances. 29 Finally, the U.S.
30
tax authorities have been tenacious in seeking necessary information.
The IRS administrative summons and grand jury subpoena are two unilateral methods employed by the U.S. tax authorities to obtain information
on the illegal use of tax havens.

28. See supra note 6 and infra notes 180 and 209 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 122-34 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 182-197 and accompanying text.
VOL. 20, NO. 4
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THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUMMONS
AND THE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA

Section 7602(a)(2) of the I.R.C. 3 1 authorizes the IRS to order a taxpayer
to appear before the IRS and produce any books and records relevant to
the taxpayer's return. Section 7602(a)(2) of the I.R.C. 32 also authorizes
the IRS to order the holder of the taxpayer's books and records to appear
and produce those books and records. The administrative summons may
be used only until the IRS refers a case to the Justice Department. 33 This
referral includes a recommendation by the U.S. Attorney General that a
grand jury investigation be conducted. 34 After referral, however, the grand
jury may obtain testimony and evidence by35issuing subpoenas, enforceable
under authority of the overseeing court.
In general, courts have treated subpoenas and administrative summonses similarly, applying the same legal principles to each. 36 There are,
however, some differences between the summons and subpoena, most
notably that the administrative summons can be issued more readily than
a subpoena, 37 and the information obtained from the summons may be
used in both civil and subsequent criminal prosecutions. In addition, the
summons can be issued to U.S. citizens outside the United States, although it is not likely to be enforceable. 38 The subpoena, on the other
hand, can be issued and can require disclosure of information in a much
shorter period of time than may a summons. 39 A subpoena issued to a
40
U.S. citizen abroad is enforceable.
The U.S. tax authorities have frequently used the administrative summons and encouraged the use of the grand jury subpoena in international
tax evasion investigations. U.S. courts have enforced this use of the
summons and subpoena so long as there exists a minimum connection
with the United States. The following discussion of cases involving the
31. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(2) (1982).
32. Id.
33. Id. at § 7602(c)(1) (1982).
34. Id. at § 7602(c)(2)(A)(i) (1982).
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.
36. GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 205.
37. Id. at 204-05.
38. There is no limitation in 26 U.S.C. §§ 7602 and 7603 (1982) regarding the service of
the summons. However, 26 U.S.C. § 7604(a) provides that the summons is enforceable by
the district court in the district in which the taxpayer resides or may be found. Thus, a
taxpayer residing outside the United States is likely not subject to an administrative summons. Cf. Navickas, Swiss Banks and Insider Trading in the United States, 2 INT'L TAX
AND Bus. L. 159, 162-65 (1984) (SEC summons is enforceable outside the United States
because the statute expressly allows service "wherever the defendant may be found." (citing
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982))).
39. GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 204.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1982).
FALL 1986

1216

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

use of a summons or subpoena is divided into four sections, each of which
covers one fact situation where the U.S. tax authorities have conducted
tax evasion investigations. The four fact situations are:
. Where the summons or subpoena is served on a foreign corporation
without substantial U.S. operations
. Where the summons or subpoena is served on a U.S. corporation to
obtain books and records held by the corporation's foreign operation;
* Where the summons or subpoena is served on the domestic operation
of a foreign corporation seeking books and records held by the foreign
corporation; and,
* Where the summons or subpoena is served on a non-resident alien
present in the United States while on business for his employer and seeking books and records held by the alien's foreign corporate employer.
1. Foreign Parent Corporationwithout
Substantial U.S. Operations
In re Arawak Trust Company (Cayman)4 1 involved the validity of U.S.

grand jury subpoenas of Arawak Trust Company, a Cayman Islands corporation. 42 While investigating a money laundering scheme in which illegal
payments to the Teamsters Union Fund were allegedly transferred through
Arawak, 43 the grand jury issued subpoenas on Arawak to Marine Midland
Overseas Corporation, an Arawak shareholder. 44 The court stated that
for an entity to be subject to U.S. territorial jurisdiction, it must be present
within the United States, although U.S. residence is not required, and
presence is established by conducting substantial and continuing activities
within the country. 45 The court then held the subpoenas invalid for lack
of territorial jurisdiction, noting that Arawak maintained no office in the
United States, did not hold itself out as doing business in the United
46
States, and held no significant property interests within the United States.
The court recognized that Arawak maintained a correspondent banking
relationship with a New York firm and that it entered into over 600 transactions for each of the previous three years with its New York correspondent involving over $60 million, 47 but refused to find presence merely
48
on that basis.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

489 F. Supp. 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 163.

Id.
Id. Marine Midland owned 28 percent of Arawak's stock and is present in New York.
Id. at 165 (citing Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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This case makes it clear that there are minimum U.S. connections
necessary for a summons or subpoena to be enforced. However, incorporation in the United States may not be the necessary minimum connection where the records sought are held in the corporation's foreign
operation, and there is a foreign law prohibiting the disclosure of the

records.
2. Domestic Corporationwith Books and
Records Held by Foreign Operation

The U.S. tax authorities have had several occasions to issue administrative summonses or to request grand jury subpoenas to domestic cor-

porations for books and records held by foreign branches and subsidiaries. 49 Two questions have arisen for the courts in their deliberations
on the enforceability of a summons or subpoena served on the domestic
corporation. First, did the domestic corporation have control of the books
and records held by the foreign operation so that the subpoena or summons
was enforceable? Second, did the existence of foreign banking and commercial secrecy laws prohibiting disclosure of the requested books and
records preclude the courts from enforcing the subpoena or summons?
The question of control has been conclusively settled. Societe Inter50
nationale Pour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers

established that the domestic corporation has control over the books and
records of its subsidiaries and a court may require production of those
records even where they are held in a foreign jurisdiction
so long as the
5
domestic corporation is subject to U.S. jurisdiction. '
49. Six cases in which U.S. tax authorities have issued summonses or subpoenas to U.S.
corporations for books and records held by a foreign operation are: In re Nat'l Pub. Util.
Inv. Corp., 79 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1935); First City Nat'l City Bank of New York v. IRS, 271
F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960); In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297
F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968);
United States v. Vetco, 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981);
and United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
50. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
51. In Societe Internationale, the Court held that a Swiss holding company controlled
certain records held by its Swiss bank on the basis of a showing that the holding company
and its bank were substantially identical. Id. at 200 and 204. The Swiss holding company
was the petitioner in the court so there was no issue of U.S. jurisdiction over the holding
company.
In First Nat'l City Bank of New York v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 948 (1960), the court held that there is a rebuttable presumption that a corporation
is in control of its own books and records. Where an officer or agent of a branch has the
authority to send the books to the parent for any corporate purpose, the parent has sufficient
control over the books for the summons or subpoena to be enforceable. See United States
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 898 n.2 (1968). The rule applies regardless of whether
the controlled operation is a branch or subsidiary. See SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, 150 F.2d
215 (9th Cir. 1945) and, In re Nat'l Pub. Util. Inv. Corp., 79 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1935).
FALL 1986
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Similarly, there is little question that Societ Internationale will be
applied in a corporation/branch relationship. U.S. courts have not distinguished between the foreign operation as a branch or subsidiary in determining the enforceability of a summons or subpoena. 5 2 Furthermore,
a branch of a domestic corporation is merely an extension of the corporation, not a separate entity, and, as such, is controlled by the corporation. 53 Thus, so long as the corporation is subject to U.S. jurisdiction, a
court may also require production of the books and records of its branches.
Whether the existence of a foreign banking and commercial secrecy
law prohibiting disclosure of the requested information precludes enforcement of the summons or subpoena has not been uniformly answered. In
United States v. Vetco, Inc. 54 the IRS issued administrative summonses
to Vetco, a domestic corporation, and to its accountants requesting the
books and records of Vetco and its Swiss subsidiary and the tax accounting
reports prepared by Vetco's accountant and the accountant's Swiss subsidiary.55 Vetco ordered its accountants not to disclose the information
and then resisted the summonses 56 by asserting, in part, that compliance
would require it to violate Swiss law. 57 The district court enforced the
summonses and imposed contempt sanctions when Vetco failed to disclose
the requested information. 58 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that
the mere existence of a foreign law prohibiting the disclosure of certain
information did not constitute an automatic bar to a U.S. court's ordering
disclosure of that information. 59 Rather, each case must be decided on
its facts. 60 When the taxpayer has made extensive good faith efforts to

comply with the order, the court must first attempt to obtain compliance
by imposing lesser sanctions against the taxpayer or drawing inferences
unfavorable to the taxpayer. 6 1 In cases where there have been no good
faith efforts at compliance, the court of appeals held that courts must use
52. See infra notes 56-118 and accompanying text.
53. Since the branch is not a separate entity, it falls under 28 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(2)(1982).
54. 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).

55. Id.at 1283-84.
56. The taxpayer has the right to quash a summons and this right extends to summonses
issued on third parties holding books and records of the taxpayer. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A)
and § 7609(a)(1)(1982).
57. 691 F.2d at 1283.
58. Id.
59. Id.at 1287.
60. Id.

61. 691 F.2d at 1287. The court of appeals cited Societ6 Internationale, 357 U.S. 197, 213
(1958) where the Supreme Court refused to allow dismissal of the Swiss holding company's
complaint upon the holding company's refusal to disclose requested information. The Court
stated that the district court could allow the U.S. government additional opportunity to
challenge the holding company's good faith, seek other methods of obtaining fuller compliance, or proceed immediately to trial on the merits.
VOL. 20, NO. 4
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a balancing test to determine whether to order disclosure or not. 62 After
finding that Vetco had not made a good faith effort at compliance, the
court went on to discuss various factors weighing in the balance. First,
the court of appeals considered the vital national interests of each country
and considered that Switzerland has a lesser interest in enforcing its secrecy laws than the United States has in enforcing its tax laws where the
source of the information is a subsidiary of an American corporation and
where the party seeking the records is the IRS which must maintain the
confidentiality of the information. 63 Second, the court of appeals addressed the extent of hardship on the taxpayer. Disclosure of information
pursuant to an IRS summons might be a defense to a violation of the
foreign secrecy laws; Section 964(c) of the I.R.C. 64 requires American
corporations to keep books and records of their controlled foreign corporations available for examination; and there was no evidence that unrelated third parties with an interest in the records would object to disclosure. 65 Third, in considering the location of the records, nationality of
the taxpayer, and the expectation of taxpayer compliance, the court of
appeals noted that the records sought were outside the United States, but
that each of the parties was either a domestic firm or was controlled by
a domestic firm. 66 Fourth, the court of appeals concluded that the documents were important since they were shown to be necessary to a determination of tax liability and there was no showing that the records
were cumulative of records already produced. 6 7 Finally, considering
whether alternate means of compliance with the summonses were available, the court of appeals found that obtaining consents to the disclosure,
issuance of letters rogatory, use of treaty provisions, concealing the names
of third parties, use of an independent expert on Swiss law to determine
which records may be disclosed, and disclosure of the records in Switzerland are not substantially equal alternatives. 68 In this case, the balancing test weighed in favor of disclosure and the order enforcing disclo69
sure was proper.

62. 691 F.2d at 1288. The balancing test is derived from the factors set forth in RESTATEFOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965).
63. Id. at 1289.
64. 26 U.S.C. § 964(c)(1)(1982) and Treas. Reg. § 1.964-3 (1983), T.D. 7893, 1983-1 C.B.
132, 144.
65. 691 F.2d at 1289-90.
66. Id. at 1290.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1290.
69. Two cases in which U.S. courts have applied the balancing test and required disclosure
are SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. I I I (S.D.N.Y. 1981) and United States
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968). Navickas, supra note 38 at 174-76,
contains an analysis of the balancing test as applied in Banca della Svizzera Italiana and
MENT (SECOND)
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An application of the balancing test in United States v. First National

Bank of Chicago70 resulted in the reversal of an order enforcing an IRS
summons issued on a U.S. corporation for the books and records of its
foreign branch. In 1979, the IRS issued a summons to First Chicago
ordering the production of bank statements available only at its branch
in Greece covering certain accounts in that branch. 7' The district court
enforced the summons, but the court of appeals reversed. The court of
appeals stated that a U.S. court is not precluded from enforcing a summons or subpoena even though disclosure of the information as required
by the court would violate foreign law. Instead, in such cases, a court
should balance the competing interests at stake. 72 The court of appeals
applied the same balancing test as used in Vetco, but felt that on the facts
available, the balancing weighed in favor of First Chicago. First, the court
of appeals felt that the Greek national interest in enforcing its secrecy
law outweighed the United States' interest in collecting taxes since the
information sought in this case was relatively unimportant. 73 The court
of appeals noted, in what the court of appeals in Vetco considered the
fourth factor, that the amount of the asset was small, there were restrictions on the conversion and export of Greek funds, and the information
sought was only to be used to levy and collect the tax, not to determine
whether there was a tax liability. 74 Second, the court of appeals concluded
that disclosure would impose a severe hardship on First Chicago and its
employees because the sanction for violating the Greek bank secrecy law
is imprisonment, not merely a fine, and its employees were not the taxpayers about whom the information was being sought. 75 Upon considering
the third factor of location of the records, taxpayer nationality and expectation of taxpayer compliance, the court of appeals noted that the
records were held in Greece, the disclosure would occur in Greece, persons of Greek nationality would make the disclosure, and First Chicago
was reluctant to expose its Greek employees to criminal liability. 76 Finally,
the court of appeals suggested that alternative means of compliance might

First Nat'l City Bank. Under slightly different facts not otherwise limiting the decision, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank
of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3086 (1983), discussed
in detail at infra, notes 82-97 that Societe Internationaledoes not hold that a subpoena may
be resisted on constitutional grounds where compliance would violate foreign law. Id. at
1388-89.
70. 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
71. Id. at 342-43.
72. Id. at 345.
73. Id. at 346.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 345-46.
76. Id. at 342 and 345.
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be available since there had been no attempt to obtain consent for the
disclosure or to determine whether the Greek secrecy law contained an
exception for the transfer of this information to the home office of First
Chicago. 77 If such disclosure would not violate Greek law, the court of
78
appeals stated that the result of the balancing test might then be different.
The apparent conflict between the holdings in First Chicago and Vetco
can be explained by the factual differences in the cases. In Vetco, the
documents sought were important in determining whether there was a tax
liability, the taxpayer was the subject of the disclosure request, 79 and
there was no finding that disclosure would violate foreign law. 80 In First
Chicago, on the other hand, the court of appeals suggested there might
be an exception to the secrecy laws thereby allowing disclosure, the records were sought only for the purpose of collecting taxes not to levy taxes
or determine a tax liability, and an unrelated third party, not the taxpayer,
81
was the target of the summons.
In summary, these cases make it clear that the IRS may successfully
mandate the production of tax information held outside the United States
on activities performed solely outside the United States. The one minimum requirement is that the information be under the control of a U.S.
person or entity or an entity controlled by a U.S. person or entity. The
cases do not completely agree, however, on whether the existence of a
foreign law prohibiting disclosure of the information precludes enforcement of the summons or subpoena. It is suggested in the next section that
a summons or subpoena requesting books and records held outside the
United States by a non-U.S. corporation may be enforceable despite a
foreign law prohibiting disclosure of the requested information when the
information sought is necessary for a determination of a U.S. tax liability
and the source of the information or a related party maintains a presence
in the United States.
3. Domestic Operation with Books and
Records Held by Foreign Corporation
The courts have ordered disclosure of requested information in cases
involving books and records held by a foreign corporation with domestic
operations, even though foreign law prohibits disclosure by the foreign
corporation. In Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova
Scotia,8 2 the court of appeals reviewed a district court order compelling
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 346.
Id.
691 F.2d at 1284.
Id. at 1287.

81. 699 F.2d at 346.
82. 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3086-87 (1983).
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the production of documents held by the foreign corporation in a federal
grand jury investigation of tax and narcotics law violations. 83 The grand
jury issued a subpoena to the Bank of Nova Scotia's Miami office ordering
it to produce certain documents regarding third party transactions involving its branch in the Bahamas. 84 The district court held the bank in
contempt when it refused to comply with the subpoena. 85 The court of
appeals upheld the district court, holding, first, that the United States was
not required to establish that the documents sought were relevant to the
grand jury investigation and that imposing such a requirement would be
an undue restriction on the grand jury. 86 Second, the court held that the
mere showing that a foreign law prohibits disclosure of the information
and that the information sought does not relate to the bank's tax liability
does not prohibit enforcement of the subpoena. 87 The court of appeals
88
cited Societe Internationale
and Vetco 89 and stated that the bank was
not deprived of due process rights since it did not make a good faith effort
to comply with the subpoena, 90 and because the Bahamian government
had not prevented the bank from complying with the subpoena. 9 1 Finally,
the court of appeals rejected the bank's arguments that comity between
the U.S. and the Bahamas precluded enforcement of the subpoena and
that the district court had improperly applied the Restatement balancing
test. 92 The court of appeals stated, first, that although the bank was not
the target of the investigation, this was not significant since the bank held
records relating to an investigation. 93 Second, there was no reason to
distinguish between requests for testimonial as compared to documentary
evidence since the effect on the Bahamas would be the same. 94 Third,
whether the information was located in the United States or the Bahamas
was not significant to the court of appeals' decision since the disclosure
would occur in the United States and because Bahamian interest in enforcing its secrecy laws would be compromised by the mere fact of the
disclosure, not just by the substance of the disclosure. 9 5 Finally, the court
of appeals opined that use of letters rogatory was not an alternate means

83. Id. at 1386.
84. Id.

85. Id. at 1387.
86. Id. at 1387-88.
87. Id. at 1388.

88. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). See supra note 51.
89. 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

691 F.2d at 1388-89.
Id.at 1389.
Id.
Id.at 1390.
Id.
Id.
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96 In this case, the balancing weighed in favor of requiring
of compliance.
97
disclosure.
In re Marc Rich & Co., Marc Rich & Co. v. United States98 similarly
involved a subpoena requesting documents held by a foreign corporation
with domestic operations. During a federal grand jury investigation of a
tax evasion scheme allegedly involving Marc Rich & Co., the grand jury
issued a subpoena to Marc Rich AG, a Swiss corporation, by serving it
on Marc Rich International, Marc Rich AG's domestic operation. Marc
Rich AG refused to disclose the requested books and records, claiming
it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court. 9 9 The court of appeals
upheld the district court's order to disclose the books and records. The
court stated that the mere fact that the subject of the subpoena was a
foreign corporation was not significant. '0 0 The territorial principle of jurisdiction was applicable since Marc Rich AG allegedly violated U.S. tax
law, and the violation would have occurred in cooperation with Marc Rich
International, which did business in the United States.' 0 ' Furthermore,
two persons who were directors of both Marc Rich AG and Marc Rich
International were residents of the United States, and at least one of them
was alleged to have been involved in the tax law violation.' 02 Therefore,
had there been a violation of the tax laws, at least some of those violations
would have occurred within the United States. 103 The court of 0appeals
4
ordered Marc Rich AG to respond to the grand jury's inquiries.1
The Swiss government strongly objected to the U.S. court's order in
Marc Rich to disclose the requested information. 10 5 Upon the district
court's order imposing the contempt sanctions, the Swiss government
filed a note of protest with the U.S. State Department.' 0 6 Then, after
Marc Rich AG agreed to produce the requested information, the Swiss
government seized the records which were to be produced on the grounds

96. Id. at 1390. The bank stated that if the documents were being sought pursuant to a
tax investigation, Bahamian judicial assistance would not be available. Id. at 1391, n.8. See
infra notes 176-197 and accompanying text for a discussion on the use of letters rogatory
by the U.S. tax authorities.
97. Id. at 1391.
98. 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3555 (1983).
99. Id. at 665.
100. Id. at 667.
101. Id. at 668.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 670 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). For a

detailed substantive analysis of the jurisdictional issue see, Note, The Marc Rich Case:
Extension of Grand Jury Subpoena Power to Nonresident Alien Corporation, 18 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 97 (1984).

105. Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
106. Id.
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that the Swiss secrecy laws would be violated. 107 Marc Rich International
eventually pleaded guilty to the tax violations, and the order to produce
the documents was terminated. 108 Nonetheless, the Swiss protest against
the United States' disregard of Swiss law was made clear.10 9
In both Bank of Nova Scotia and Marc Rich, United States courts

upheld the validity of subpoenas issued to foreign corporations but served
on domestic operations. Prior to these cases, however, the U.S. courts
had already gone one step further in attempting to gather information on
tax evasion in tax haven countries. The courts enforced a subpoena of a
foreign corporation which was served on a non-resident alien employee
of the corporation on business in the United States. The foreign corporation was not required to have any U.S. presence.
4. Subpoena of a Non-Resident Alien
Employee of a Foreign Corporation
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Field," 10 involved the

validity of a subpoena issued to Anthony Field, a Canadian citizen residing
in the Cayman Islands. During 1975 and 1976, a grand jury was investigating criminal tax evasion activities being conducted through the Castle
Bank and Trust Company, a Cayman Islands corporation."'I Field was a
director of Castle Bank and, while in the transit hall of Miami International
Airport, was served with a subpoena ordering his testimony before the
grand jury. 112 Field refused to answer questions before the grand jury on
the grounds that the subpoena was invalid. First, he claimed, the subpoena
violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because to
require him to testify would subject him to prosecution under Cayman
Islands law. 113 Second, the principle of comity between nations precluded
requiring him to testify. 114 Third, the court lacked jurisdiction over him
because he was a non-resident alien, the personal service on him while
in the United States notwithstanding.' 15 The court of appeals rejected
each of Field's arguments and affirmed the district court's order holding
107. Id.
108. Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1984, at 36, col. 1.
109. Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1983, at 3, col. 2; Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1984, at 30, col. 1; and,
Egger, U.S. Jurisdiction in Conflict with Swiss Sovereignty, 1984 INT'L Bus. LAW. 225.
110. 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976).
111. Id. at 405. See generally, Oversight Hearings Into the Operations of the IRS (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven and Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program): Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) [hereinafter referred to as Oversight Hearings].
112. 532 F.2d at 405.
113. Id. at 406.
114. Id. at 407.
115. Id. at 409.
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Field in contempt. The court held that the Fifth Amendment protected
only against the use of his compelled answers; it does not protect against
situations where the mere act of testifying is an offense under foreign
law. "16 In deciding the issue of comity between nations, the court referred
to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
and held that the United States' interest in obtaining information on the
violation of its tax laws overcame the Cayman Islands' right of privacy
incorporated into its bank secrecy laws. 117 Finally, the court conclusively
settled the issue of Field's immunity because of his non-resident alien
status stating that anyone within the jurisdiction of the court, whether
resident or citizen or not, may be compelled to appear before a grand
jury. 18 Field was within the jurisdiction of the court when he was served
with the subpoena.
This analysis of the case law regarding the use of administrative summonses and subpoenas suggests that the summons and subpoena are an
effective tool for the U.S. tax authorities in tax evasion investigations.
U.S. courts have been willing to enforce these summonses and subpoenas
so long as sufficient minimum U.S. connections are maintained. These
cases indicate the low level to which the minimum connections standard
has been reduced. Where summonses and subpoenas cannot be enforced,
other information gathering tools, such as IRS paid informants, must be
utilized.

B. IRS

PAID INFORMANTS

Use of paid informants by IRS agents is specifically authorized by
statute. 119 The U.S. tax authorities have commonly used paid informants
120
Informants have proven
to obtain information on tax evasion activities.
indispensable in certain international tax evasion investigations, primarily
because the information sought could not be obtained in any other
manner. 12 1 One such investigation was Project Haven, an investigation
into tax evasion activities in the Bahamas and Cayman Islands centered
around the Castle Bank and Trust Company. 122 Project Haven is more
significant, however, as an indicator of the extent to which the U.S. tax

116. Id. at 406-07.
117. Id. at 407-08.

118. 532 F.2d at 409-10 (citing United States v. Germann, 370 F.2d 1019, 1022-23 (2d Cir.
1967, vacated and remanded upon death of petitioner, 389 U.S. 329 (1967)).

119. 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (1982).
120. GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 124-26.
121. Id. at 124.
122. See generally, Oversight Hearings, supra note 111. In re Grand Jury Proceedings,

United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976) at notes 116-24, involved grand jury
proceedings which arose out of the Project Haven investigations.
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authorities will go to obtain information on tax evasion activities in tax

haven countries.
In the mid 1960's, the IRS began an investigation into the alleged use
of foreign trust accounts by U.S. taxpayers, including organized crime
figures, for the purpose of evading U.S. income taxes. 123 The investigation
was named Operation Tradewinds. 124 The IRS utilized two to three agents
and thirty to thirty-five paid informants, operating in both the Bahamas
and the United States. 125 The investigation ultimately evolved to the point
of involving IRS resources nationwide with an informant network so highly
developed that the IRS could request and receive detailed and specific
information on short notice. 126
In 1972, Project Haven was initiated to investigate the dealings of a
narcotics trafficker with a Bahamian bank, the Castle Bank and Trust
Company (Bahamas), which had been uncovered in the Operation Tradewinds investigation. 127 The IRS utilized an informant, Norman Casper,
to supply information concerning the narcotic trafficker's accounts with
Castle Bank. 128 Casper developed a close social relationship with Michael
Wolstencroft, vice president of Castle Bank, which included arranging
dates for Wolstencroft during trips to Miami. 129 On one occasion, Casper
was informed by Wolstencroft that Wolstencroft would be traveling to
Chicago via Miami with a list of bank clients to be taken to the law firm
of Levenfeld, Kanter, Baskes & Lippitz, and that he wanted Casper to
arrange a date for him in Miami. 130 Casper arranged the date with Sybil
Kennedy, a former policewoman. 13 1 While Kennedy and Wolstencroft
were dining out, Casper entered Kennedy's apartment with the key Kennedy had given him and located Wolstencroft's briefcase containing the
account records.1 32 Casper delivered the documents to an IRS agent who
123. Oversight Hearings, supra note I l I at 23 and 197.
124. Id.
125. id. at 138-40.
126. Id. at 139.
127. Id. at 140-41 and GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 115.
128. GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 115.
129. Oversight Hearings, supra note I II at 159-61; GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at
115, and United States v. Baskes, 442 F. Supp. 322. 326 (N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'd, 649 F.2d
471 (1980).
130. Oversight Hearings, supra note I Il at 160; Baskes, 442 F. Supp. at 326; and United
States v. Baskes, 433 F. Supp. 799, 801 (1977), conviction upheld, 442 F. Supp. 322 (N.D.
111. 1977), aff'd, 649 F.2d 471 (1980).
131. Oversight Hearings, supra note Ill at 160. Kennedy received $1,000 from Casper
for her services, which Casper asserted included only accompanying Wolstencroft. Oversight
Hearings, supra note I Il at 160 and Baskes, 442 F. Supp. at 326. But see, Baskes, 433 F.
Supp. at 801 where the court claimed Kennedy "engaged in sexual intercourse for

compensation."
132. Baskes, 442 F. Supp. at 326; Oversight Hearings, supra note I II at 143-44 and 17778; and GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 115.
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copied them and then returned them in the briefcase to Kennedy's apartment. Subsequently, Kennedy visited Wolstencroft at the Castle Bank and
Trust offices and surreptitiously removed a card file containing the names
and addresses of Castle Bank clients. This was delivered to the IRS
investigators. 133
The information obtained by these efforts proved extremely valuable.
Over 300 names and account numbers were disclosed, and these names
led to the development of sixty-three cases of recommended deficiencies
totalling $27.5 million. 134 These names also lead to the criminal indictment
of members of the Levenfeld, Kanter, Baskes & Lippitz law firm in Chicago which had assisted in the tax evasion activities conducted through
the Castle Bank. 135 The method used to obtain the Castle Bank records
posed no legal problem for the U.S. tax authorities. In United States v.
Payner,136 the Supreme Court discussed the issue of whether the evidence
from the briefcase should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court held that the defendant Payner, a subject of the Project Haven
investigation, did not have standing to suppress the information since the
Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of only that evidence obtained by
conduct which invaded the defendant's expectation of privacy.' 37 The
Fourth Amendment does not apply where, as in Payner, the defendant
38
had no privacy interest in Wolstencroft's briefcase.1
The IRS was the target of a great deal of public criticism for its conduct
in the Project Haven investigation 139 and the subject of an extensive
congressional committee hearing,' 40 primarily because of the methods
used to obtain the Castle Bank records. Nonetheless, the IRS continually
asserted that its conduct was not improper 14 1 and its actions were supported by at least some members of Congress.14 2 Furthermore, the IRS
subsequently stated that it would continue disseminating information obtained in the Project Haven investigation to its field offices. 143 The IRS
133. Baskes, 433 F. Supp. at 802.
134. Oversight Hearings, supra note Ill at 31 and 45-47.

135. See, United States v. Baskes, 433 F. Supp. at 799, where the defendants Baskes,
Kanter. and Hammerman were members of the Levenfeld, Kanter, Baskes & Lippitz law
firm.
136.
137.
138.
139.

447 U.S. 727 (1980).
Id. at 731.
Id. at 731-32.
Netherlands Antilles Hearings, supra note I at 33 (statement of William J. Anderson,

General Government Division, General Accounting Office).
140. Oversight Hearings, supra note I 11.

141. Id. at 27 (statement of Meade Whitaker, chief counsel, IRS).
142. Id. at 117 (statement of Congressman Garry Brown).
143. Letter from Donald C. Alexander, commissioner IRS, to Congressman Benjamin S.
Rosenthal. chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce. Consumer and Monetary Affairs dated
October 25, 1975. Id. at 81.
FALL 1986

1228

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

also intimated that it might continue the Project Haven investigation. 144
Thus, aggressive investigations of this character in future IRS investigations might well be expected.
Not all unilateral investigation tools used by the U.S. tax authorities
are so intrusive. The IRS has also conducted investigations, sometimes
involving other governmental agencies, where the investigation is highly
visible or involves only information which is not subject to any secrecy
laws.
C. EXCLUSIVE IRS

INVESTIGATIONS

The IRS frequently engages in investigations using only IRS agents or
in cooperation with other governmental agencies.

I. The Swiss Mail Watch
In 1967, the IRS formed a task force to obtain information on secret
foreign bank accounts. One of the projects of this task force was to identify
U.S. taxpayers receiving mail from Swiss banks. 145 The IRS microfilmed
the exterior of all envelopes believed to originate from Swiss banks, using
the postal meter stamp to identify the originating financial institution. 146
This activity was conducted from January to May 1968, from January to
February 1969, and from December 1970 to February 1971.147 The first
mail watch provided information sufficient to initiate 168 audits which
resulted in the assessment of about $2 million in taxes and penalties. 148
The 1969 and 1970-71 mail watches identified over 40,000 taxpayers having
49
foreign bank accounts. No audits or assessments directly resulted.1
2. Revenue Service Representatives
The Revenue Service Representative assists the IRS in conducting audits and examinations outside the United States and in generally obtaining

144. Id.
145. Netherlands Antilles Hearings, supra note 1 at 31 (statement of William J. Anderson,

director, General Government Division, General Accounting Office).
146. GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 113. The legality of the Swiss Mail Watch was
upheld in United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076 (2d. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
958 (1976).
147. GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 113-14.
148. Id. at 113.

149. Id. at 114. The fact that no audits resulted does not mean that the Mail Watch was
not productive. The Mail Watch was discontinued, in part, because of fears that use of the
Mail Watch might jeopardize the negotiations then being conducted with Switzerland regarding the United States-Switzerland Mutual Assistance Treaty. See infra notes 240-49
and accompanying text.
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public information on taxpayer activities in foreign countries. 150 With the
exception of gathering public information, the RSR has typically proven
successful only in obtaining specifically requested information. 15' First,
foreign government permission is necessary to conduct an on-site examination, and the tax haven countries have not always been supportive
of U.S. tax collection efforts. ' 5 2 Second, the taxpayer will obviously not
provide the necessary consent under foreign law to the audit or examination if he or she has violated the U.S. tax laws. 153 Finally, the RSR is
unable to order production of books and records with an administrative
summons since the summons is enforceable only where a person resides
or may be found in a U.S. district court jurisdiction. 54 The investigation
must have been referred to a grand jury before the U.S. tax authorities
155
can compel the production of books and records.
3. Public Information Gathering
The IRS does not routinely examine public records as an information
gathering tool. Typically, this is because public records are often unavailable, or if available, either the records do not contain useful information or the local government prevents the IRS from gathering the information. 156 The Cayman Islands prohibits the disclosure of any corporate
information other than the name and registered office of the corporation
and the date of incorporation. 157 Switzerland, on the other hand, maintains
extensive public records. ' 58 A company must file its business charter, the
names and nationalities of directors and managers, names of founders or
partners and their contribution, liabilities and preferential rights, the amount
of authorized and paid-in capital, names and powers of persons authorized
to sign on behalf of the corporation, and the method of publishing official
notices. ' 59 Despite the extensive disclosure requirements, the identity of
owners of a Swiss entity can easily be concealed through the use of
nominees or bearer shares. 160 Even where public information is available,
both Switzerland and the Cayman Islands closely regulate information
150. GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 200. The Revenue Service Representative [hereinafter referred to as RSR] is an overseas employee of the IRS. Id.
151. Id.

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.

155. The grand jury subpoena may be enforced against U.S. citizens outside the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1982).
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 198.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
Id.
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gathering by the U.S. tax authorities by requiring advance governmental
approval for the investigation. 161 Swiss law also provides for imprisonment for unauthorized information gathering in that country. 162
The preceeding discussion has examined the primary unilateral information gathering tools used by the U.S. tax authorities in tax evasion
investigations. The next category of information gathering tools is the
IRS' use of reporting requirements, both those imposed on the taxpayer
and those imposed on financial institutions.
III. Internal Revenue Service Reporting Requirements
Despite broad authority in the Secretary of the Treasury to require the
filing of tax returns and the maintaining of books and records, 163 the
taxpayer has not proven a valuable source of information in tax evasion
investigations. First, taxpayers will obviously not knowingly disclose information on their own tax evasion efforts. 164 Second, even when information is provided on IRS forms, the information is often of poor quality
and the IRS has experienced difficulty in processing the information.1 65
One effective source of reporting information is the Currency Transaction
Report (CTR) filed by domestic financial institutions, which is useful in
tracking international cash flows. 166 The Treasury Regulations provide
that certain financial institutions and other entities must report each currency transaction exceeding $10,000.167 There are certain limited exceptions. 168 The IRS then enters this information on its computer system
which, in audit situations, is accessed and compared to the representations
made on the taxpayer's return.169

161. Id.

162.
of the
I I I at
163.

Id. See also TAx HAVEN INFORMATION BOOK, supra note 6 for a general summary
bank secrecy laws of several tax haven countries; Oversight Hearings, supra note
162-76 for a reprint of the Bahamian secrecy laws; and supra note 6, generally.
26 U.S.C. § 6001 (1982).

164. See, GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 180-84.

165. Id. The U.S. tax authorities have, however, met with some success in their efforts
to prosecute violations of the currency export reporting laws discussed in the GORDON
REPORT, supra note 3 at 180-84. See Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1986, at 23, col. 6.
166. Id. at 186-87. The Currency Transaction Report [hereinafter referred to as CTRI
was created pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, Titles I and 11, 84 Stat.
I114-24 (1970).
167. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.22-103.51 (1984).

168. Id. 31 C.F.R. § 103 was amended in 1980 by Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting
of Currency and Foreign Transactions, 45 Fed. Reg. 37,818 (1980) (codified at 31 C.F.R.
§ 103 (1980)). The amendments reduced the available exceptions from the reporting
requirements.
169. GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 187 and see Senate Hearings, supra note 2 at 3335 (statement of John M. Walker, Jr., assistant secretary, enforcement, Department of the
Treasury).
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The purpose and value of the CTR became clear during the recent
federal prosecution of First National Bank of Boston. 170 The Justice Department had been investigating a money laundering scheme at First National involving organized crime. 171 The Justice Department discovered
that from 1980 through 1983 an individual allegedly involved in organized
crime had exchanged paper bags full of cash for 163 cashier's checks
totalling $2.2 million. 172 First National failed to report these transactions
as required. 173 The Justice Department subsequently discovered that First
National failed to report $1.22 billion in cash transactions with Swiss
banks. 174 The Justice Department's use of CTRs in uncovering First National's failure to disclose these financial dealings should serve as a warning that the United States tax authorities are increasing their use of CTRs
as a major information gathering tool and will be strictly enforcing the
75
CTR reporting requirements.1
CTRs may prove effective information gathering tools in tax evasion
investigations involving domestic financial institutions. But, CTRs cannot
be used in investigations involving foreign financial institutions not obligated to file CTRs. In those investigations where charges or suit has been
filed, the U.S. tax authorities may consider using letters rogatory to obtain
information from foreign sources, including foreign financial institutions.
IV. Letters Rogatory
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the gathering of evi76
dence in a foreign country through the assistance of a foreign tribunal. 1
77
The U.S. court in which the matter is being heard'
sends a written
170. Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
171. Id., and Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1985, at 2, col. 2.
172. Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1985, at I, col. 6.
173. Id.
174. Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1985, at 2, col. 2.
175. At the time, the $500,000 fine imposed on First National was the largest fine ever
imposed on a financial institution for violating the currency reporting law. Wall St. J., Feb.
8, 1985, at 2, col. 2. This led a Wall Street Journal reporter to state that federal officials
were making an example of First National in their attempt to stop money laundering activities. Wall St. J., Mar. 7. 1985, at 1, col. 6. Subsequently, several violations of CTR reporting
requirements have been reported and even higher fines have been imposed. Wall St. J., Feb.
19, 1985, at 3, col. 2; Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1985, at I, col. I and at 3, col. 1; Wall St. J.,
Mar. II, 1985, at 3, col. 1; Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1985, at 5, col. 1; Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1985,
at 3, col. 2; Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1985, at 3, col. 2; and Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1986, at 3, col.
4. U.S. tax authorities have also conducted searches of offices of retail brokerage firms
seeking records of cash transactions not reported to the IRS. Wall St. J., April 4, 1985, at
12, col. 2.
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
177. Letters rogatory may be used only in a judicial proceeding. BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 815 (5th ed. 1979) and The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941), action
dismissed, 39 F. Supp. 810 (E.D. La. 1941), aff'd sub nom., The Florida, 133 F.2d 719
(1943).
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request, a "letter rogatory," on behalf of the party seeking the information
asking for the assistance of the foreign tribunal. 178 The foreign tribunal
will, if it decides to grant assistance, obtain the requested information
through its own powers of investigation and convey it to the U.S. court. 179
The U.S. tax authorities have rarely used the letter rogatory principally
because not all foreign courts cooperate with the request 80 and because
of the strict bank and commercial secrecy laws in those countries. 181 A
major breakthrough in the use of letters rogatory occurred, however, in
the case of United States of America v. Carver,LeMire, et al. 182 In 1982,

criminal charges were pending in the U.S. against Roy Carver, Joseph
LeMire, Lionel Achuck, Jon Stephens and Interconex, Inc. 183 The United
States requested the assistance of the Cayman Islands Grand Court to
order certain Cayman banks to disclose information on transactions involving the banks, the defendants, and Redcon Limited and International
Resource Management Consultants, two Cayman Islands companies controlled by LeMire and Carver.184 The banks refused to disclose the information voluntarily and the Cayman Grand Court refused to order the
banks to disclose the information. 185 The United States appealed the
Grand Court's decision to the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal.1 86 The

178. The Signe, 37 F. Supp. at 820 and, Ings. v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir.
1960).
179. Id.
180. GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 205, and SENATE STAFF STUDY, supra note I at
18.
181. Netherlands Antilles Hearings, supra note I at 263-64 and 278 (statement of John E.
Chapoton, assistant secretary for tax policy, Department of the Treasury). The IRS especially complained in the Netherlands Antilles Hearings about the lack of cooperation on the
part of the Netherlands Antilles and provided the committee with a list of tax fraud cases
involving the Netherlands Antilles. Id. at 356-66. The Netherlands Antilles government
submitted a prepared statement at the hearings strongly defending its conduct and responding
to the IRS' complaints. The Netherlands Antilles government asserted that it had gone
beyond the requirements of the tax treaty in exchanging with the United States information
on tax crimes. It also stated that it was not the only country which faced legal obstacles in
its secrecy laws to providing information to its treaty partners. Id. at 798-817. See id. at
478-81 and Current and Quotable, 20 TAX NOTES 171-72 (1983) for copies of letters between
Doug Barnard, Jr., chairman, Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee,
Richard C. Wassenaar, commissioner, Criminal Investigations, IRS and Harold Henriquez,
minister plenipotentiary for Netherlands Antilles Affairs discussing the Netherlands Antilles
Hearings.
182. Civil Appeal No. 5, slip op. (Cayman Islands Court of Appeal, Nov. 1982) (on file
with the INTERNATIONAL LAWYER) and see Tax Havens in the Caribbean Basin, supra note
8 at 5; SENATE STAFF STUDY, supra note I at 125-26; and, Senate Hearings, supra note 2
at 52-53.
183. United States of America v. Carver, LeMire, et al, Civil Appeal No. 5, slip op. at
4 (Cayman Islands Court of Appeal, Nov. 1982).
184. Id. at 5-6.
185. Id. at 6.
186. Id. at 10.
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Court of Appeal reversed the Grand Court and held that, in this case,
Cayman law allows disclosure by the banks and that the disclosure should
be made. The court stated that a Cayman court should give effect to
foreign court requests for assistance in gathering evidence so long as the
request is not frivolous, excessive, vexatious, or an abuse of process of
the court. 187 The court also stated that the Cayman Islands secrecy laws
do not suggest that it is the public policy of the Cayman Islands to allow
a person to "launder the proceeds of a crime in the Cayman Islands,
secure from detection and punishment." 88 The court held that there are
only four conditions that must be met before a Cayman court can order
disclosure of information requested by a foreign court: the request be for
particular information; 189 the information be relevant to an ongoing prosecution; 190 there be special circumstances justifying an exception to the
Cayman bank secrecy laws for disclosing the requested information; 19 1
and, in cases as this, when the evidence is sought from accounts not in
the defendants' names, there be strong suspicion that the information
sought will be used against the named defendants at trial.' 9 2 The court
found that each condition was met. The request was for particular information to the extent that it sought "all correspondence, ledgers, day
books, [and] account books."' 193 The information sought was certainly
relevant to the defendants' ongoing prosecution in the United States for
obtaining money under false pretenses and for interstate and foreign transfer of stolen property. 194 There were special circumstances justifying disclosure since the evidence was sought for use in a foreign court, the
requesting party had no alternate method for obtaining the information,
and the evidence obtained would be helpful only if the actual books were
produced. 195 Finally, the strong suspicion requirement was met by the
United States' allegations in its request to the Grand Court that International Resource Management Consultants (IRMC) was controlled by
Carver and LeMire, that over $200,000 U.S. was transferred to IRMC's
account through a Swiss account controlled by Carver and LeMire and
through two checks payable to Carver's wife, that Redcon Limited was
controlled by Carver and LeMire, and that Redcon received $500,000
96
U.S. from a Liechtenstein entity controlled by Carver and LeMire. 1
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 13-14.
See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
Carver, slip op. at 14-15.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 4, and see 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and 2314 (1982).
Carver, slip op. at 13-14.
Id. at 15.
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With this breakthrough, the use of letters rogatory, at least in the Cayman Islands, appears far more promising, although such requests had not
proven fruitful in the past. Carver should not be read to suggest that tax
evasion investigations in the Cayman Islands will be routine; the four
conditions must still be met which, in turn, requires a significant knowledge of the facts behind the tax evasion activity. Nonetheless, the Justice
Department has indicated its willingness to take every request for information to the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal if necessary. 197 Accordingly, in light of Carver, one might expect that more letters rogatory will
be sent to the Cayman Islands and perhaps more cooperation will be
rendered by the Cayman government.
Notwithstanding the decision in Carver, the usefulness of the letter
rogatory still is generally limited by the willingness of the foreign courts
to cooperate. The U.S. tax authorities have attempted to overcome this
problem and to generally establish formal channels of communication in
tax evasion investigations by negotiating bilateral agreements with other
countries. There are several types of bilateral agreements presently in
effect, but at minimum each requires the signatory countries to exchange
tax information in certain circumstances.
A.

BILATERAL TAX TREATIES

The United States presently has twenty-nine income tax treaties in
force.19 8 Because of extensions to territories and former colonies, the
treaties cover almost forty territories and countries. 199 The tax treaties
have two basic purposes: the avoidance of international double taxation
200
and the prevention of international tax avoidance and evasion.
An important provision of an income tax treaty which is intended to
reduce tax avoidance and evasion is the exchange of information clause. 20 1
The exchange of information clause typically authorizes the taxing authority to request and exchange information relevant to the enforcement
of tax laws with information on dividends, interest, rents and royalties
being routinely exchanged. 20 2 The exchange of information provision may
vary depending on whether the treaty is based on the U.S. Model Income

197. Senate Hearings, supra note 2 at 52.
198. Income nix Treaties: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980) (statement of David Brockway,
International Tax Counsel, Joint Committee on Taxation Staff). For a listing of the countries
see, [II AUDrr] INTERNAL REV. MAN. (CCH) Exhibit 42(10)0-1.
199. see, [II AUDrr] INTERNAL REV. MAN. (CCH) exhibit 42(10)0-1.
200. Income Tax Treaties, supra note 198 at 3.
201. Id. at 24.
202. Irish, supra note 8 at 507.
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Tax Treaty 20 3 or on the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, 20 4 but the result
should not vary significantly given the similarity of the clauses. 20 5 These
treaties and the exchange of information clauses have generally proven
effective only in circumstances involving the routine exchange of
206
information.
Not all income tax treaties have benefited U.S. information gathering
efforts. First, the tax treaties do not require the information to be provided
in a specific form, with the result that much of the information received
from a foreign jurisdiction is not readily useable by the U.S. tax authorities. 20 7 Second, the tax treaties expressly provide that no disclosure of
20 8
information is required if disclosure would violate local secrecy laws.
Thus, many tax havens do not provide the detailed information requested
by the U.S. tax authorities 20 9 and, instead, provide only information that
is often public knowledge and substantively insufficient to detect and
prosecute tax evasion. 2 10 Finally, the income tax treaties have allowed
treaty shopping by residents of non-signatory countries through the easily
satisfied residence requirements. 2 '1 These treaty shopping activities often
lead to tax evasion efforts 2 12 that cannot be discovered since there is no
tax treaty under which information can be exchanged.
These shortcomings of the bilateral tax treaties with tax haven countries
have caused the U.S. tax authorities to reexamine all such tax treaties
2 13
and either terminate or renegotiate those treaties that are being abused.
This renegotiation/termination policy is intended to eliminate treaty shop2 14
ping and to obtain more favorable exchange of information agreements.
The U.S. government has developed two different methods for encouraging countries to renegotiate their income tax treaties with the United
[1 Tax Treaties] FED. TAXES (P-H) para. 1022.
Id. para. 1017.
Compare art. 26, U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, id. at 1022, with art. 26, OECD
Income Tax Treaty, id. at 1017.
206. See, GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 208-09.
207. Income Tax Treaties, supra note 198, at 24.

203.
204.
205.
Model

208. See, [I Tax Treaties] FED. TAXES (P-H) para. 1022, art. 26 and para. 1017, art. 26.
209. Letter from Doug Barnard, Jr., chairman, Commerce, Consumer and Monetary
Affairs Subcommittee to Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., commissioner, IRS, dated June 7, 1983,
reprinted in Current and Quotable, 20 TAX NOTES 171 (1983).

210. Letter from Richard C. Wassenaar, commissioner for Criminal Investigations, IRS
to Doug Barnard, Jr., chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary
Affairs, dated June 15, 1983, reprinted in Netherlands Antilles Hearings, supra note I at

478-79.
211. Senate Hearings, supra note 2 at 37 (statement of Alan W. Granwell, international
tax counsel, Department of the Treasury) and Netherlands Antilles Hearings, supra note I
at 261-62 (statement of John E. Chapoton, assistant secretary for tax policy, Department
of the Treasury).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 262 and see supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
214. Id.
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States. First, the recently enacted Caribbean Basin Initiative 2 15 limited
the extension of certain tax benefits under the act to only those countries
which have entered into a bilateral or multilateral exchange of information
agreement with the United States. 216 Second, the Foreign Sales Corporation legislation 217 limits the approved host countries list to only those
countries that are one of four qualifying U.S. possessions, have signed a
CBI exchange of information agreement, 218 or have an approved bilateral
income tax treaty with the United States. 2 19 For countries that do not
desire to negotiate income tax treaties, Congress has suggested possible
sanctions including treating loans from haven banks as U.S. income, prohibiting tax losses on transactions with haven banks, and curbing airline
2 20
flights between the United States and these countries.
The U.S. tax authorities' renegotiation/termination policy has met with
some success as several countries are renegotiating their income tax treaties with the United States while others are negotiating or have adopted
CBI exchange of information agreements with the United States. 22 1 The
new CBI exchange of information agreement may prove an extremely
valuable information gathering tool in future tax evasion investigations.

B. CBI

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AGREEMENTS

The most recently developed information gathering tool is the CBI
exchange of information agreement. Barbados was the first country to
enter into a CBI agreement, having signed the agreement with the United
States on November 3, 1984.222 On November 8, 1984, the Treasury
announced that the United States and Costa Rica agreed on the text of a
223
CBI agreement and that signing would take place in the near future.
Similarly, a CBI exchange of information agreement was finalized with
the Dominican Republic in August 1984.224
215. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Title 11Caribbean Basin Initiative, Pub.
L. No. 98-67 (1983) [hereinafter referred to as CBI].
216. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act amended 26 U.S.C. § 274(h)6 (1982)
to allow tax deductions for conventions in the beneficiary countries, as defined in section
212(b) of the CBI, if those countries entered into exchange of information agreements with
the United States.
217. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Title VIII Foreign Sales Corporations, Pub. L. No.

98-369 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as FSC legislation].
218. See supra note 215 and infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
219. 26 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 927(e)(3)(1982). For a list of the approved FSC host countries
see, TAX NOTES INT'L, Dec. 1984 at 4 and 70 and Treasury News, 24 TAX NOTES 833 (1984).

220. Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1985, at I, col. 5.
221. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text and see Treasury News, 24 TAX NOTES
833 (1984) and TAx NOTES INT'L, Dec. 1984 at 4 and 70.
222. Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1985, at I, col. 5 and TAx NOTES INT'L, Dec. 1984 at 70.
223. TAX NOTES INT'L, Dec. 1984 at 70.
224. Treasury News, 24 TAX NOTES 833 (1984).
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Although these agreements have not yet been tested in a tax evasion
investigation, their information gathering value may well be significant.
The CBI exchange of information agreement is to provide for:
The exchange of such information ... as may be necessary or appropriate to
carry out and enforce the tax laws of the United States and the beneficiary
country (whether criminal or civil proceedings), including information which
may otherwise be subject to nondisclosure provisions of the local law of the
such as provisions respecting bank secrecy and bearershares.
beneficiary country
225
(emphasis added)

The United States Model Income Tax Treaty provides that:
In no case shall the obligation [to disclose information] be construed so as to
impose on a Contracting State the obligation

(a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;

(b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the
normal course of the administrative practice of that or of the other
(c)

Contracting State;
to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, indus-

trial, commercial, or professional secret or trade process, or information
226
the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre public).

Thus, on their face the information disclosure provisions under the CBI
exchange of information agreement are far more inclusive than the exchange of information provisions presently in force in the bilateral income
tax treaties. Whether these agreements will, in fact, prove of value in tax
evasion investigations remains to be seen. The first real test will probably
occur in an investigation involving Costa Rica, the most significant tax
haven of the three countries that have signed such an agreement.
Both the bilateral tax treaties and the CBI exchange of information
agreements are generally used to exchange tax information upon the request of one party. These information exchanges cannot, however, provide
a complete picture of the tax situation of a multinational taxpayer with
transactions involving more than one country. 227 Thus, the U.S. tax authorities implemented a simultaneous examination program with some of
the U.S. bilateral income tax treaty partners.
C. SIMULTANEOUS EXAMINATION PROGRAM

Under the authority of the information exchange provisions of the bilateral income tax treaties, the United States has implemented a simultaneous examination program with six countries: Canada, the United

225. 26 U.S.C. § 174(h)6(C)(i)(1982).
226. [1 Tax Treaties] FED. TAXES (P-H) para. 1022, art. 26.
227. Outline of address by Glenn Cagle, deputy assistant commissioner (Compliance),

IRS, Tax Executives Institute, Vancouver, Canada (Sept. 29, 1980) at 6-7.
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Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Norway, and Italy.228
These procedures allow the tax authorities in each country to conduct
concurrent examinations of the books and records of related taxpayers,
typically a multinational corporation. 229 The rationale for the simultaneous examination is that the tax authorities may obtain and exchange
information more efficiently and thoroughly and with greater specificity
2 30
and speed.
The IRS has activated the simultaneous examination procedure only
rarely, 23 1 but the procedure has proven effective. One case involving a
simultaneous audit with Canada resulted in income adjustments of $19
million, more than $6.5 million of which was directly attributable to the
simultaneous examination. 232 Because of the general success of the pro233
gram, the IRS is in the process of extending it to other treaty partners.
Furthermore, the bilateral simultaneous examination program has been
expanded into a multilateral simultaneous examination program 234 and is
conducted as a series of concurrent bilateral examinations. 235 The multilateral simultaneous examination covers the deficiencies in the bilateral
simultaneous examination when the taxpayer is engaged in activities involving several foreign countries.2 36 The U.S. tax authorities cannot,
however, give to one party in a multilateral simultaneous examination
237
information that was received from another party to the examination.
Nonetheless, bilateral information exchanges can be made. 2 38 The U.S.
tax authorities anticipate increasing use of the multilateral and bilateral
239
simultaneous examinations in tax evasion investigations.
Considering each of the bilateral investigation tools discussed thus far,
the United States has some type of bilateral exchange of information
228. [II AUDIT] INTERNAL REV. MAN. (CCH) para. 40(10)(10).7. These procedures are

authorized under the exchange of information clause in the bilateral income tax treaty with
each country. Cagle, supra note 227 at I.
229. [II AUDIT] INTERNAL REV. MAN. (CCH) para. 42 (10)(10).7. Each country examines
the books and records of only the related taxpayer within its jurisdiction. Id. at 42(10)(10).7(2).
230. Recent Developments, Taxation: Implementation of Simultaneous Auditing Procedures, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 798, 801-02 (1980).
231. As of Sept. 1980, the IRS had conducted only eleven simultaneous examinations.
Cagle, supra note 228 at 4.
232. Netherlands Antilles Hearings,supra note I at 226 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger,
commissioner, IRS).
233. Senate Hearings, supra note 2 at 39 (statement of Alan W. Granwell, international
tax counsel, Department of the Treasury).
234. [1I AUDIT] INTERNAL REV. MAN. (CCH) para. 42(10)(10).7(5)(a) and (b).
235. Cagle, supra note 228 at 5.
236. Id. at 6-7.
237. [II AUDIT] INTERNAL REV. MAN. (CCH) para. 42(10)(10).7(5)(c) and Cagle, supra
note 228 at 8.
238. Cagle, supra note 228 at 7-8.
239. Id. at 5 and 9.
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agreement with virtually every industrialized country. With Switzerland,
however, the United States has relied upon a broader mutual assistance
agreement in effect between the countries which provides for a variety
of judicial assistance methods in several circumstances, including tax
investigations. This agreement is the United States-Switzerland Mutual
Assistance Treaty.
D.

THE UNITED STATES-SWITZERLAND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TREATY

The United States and Switzerland entered into a mutual assistance
treaty in 1977.240 The agreement provides for a broad array of bilateral
judicial assistance methods, primarily in the nature of information exchange procedures. The United States sought the agreement for the specific purpose of lifting the Swiss banking secrecy law, especially when tax
violations, securities law offenses and organized crime activities were
24 1
being prosecuted.
While the United States and Switzerland agreed that the banking secrecy laws will be lifted in criminal investigations, this agreement does
not provide authority for the disclosure of information in most U.S. tax
evasion investigations. First, the treaty expressly states that it does not
apply to violations with respect to taxes except for certain gambling crimes
and drug and firearm crimes included within the tax laws. 242 Second, the
Mutual Assistance Treaty provides for compulsory exchange of information only in criminal cases where the offense for which the information
is sought is a crime in both Switzerland and the United States. 24 3 The
treaty lists the criminal offenses for which compulsory measures are automatically available. 244 Tax evasion is not a covered offense. Third, even
under the treaty section providing for the discretionary use of compulsory
disclosure, tax evasion would not be a covered offense since tax evasion,
as defined by Swiss law, is considered a minor offense in Switzerland,
not a crime. 245 In tax evasion cases Swiss Cantonal law protects against
240. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 23, 1977, United States-Switzerland,
27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter referred to as Mutual Assistance Treaty].
241. Navickas, supra note 38 at 172 and Honegger, supra note 6 at 14.
242. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 240 at art. 2, para. 5 and schedule, nos. 26
and 30.
243. Id. at art. 4, para. 2. Navickas, supra note 38 at 172 and Recent Developments,
InternationalAgreements: United States-SwitzerlandIn vestigation of Insider Trading Through
Swiss Banks, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 437, 438 (1983).

244. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 240 at schedule. See, Honegger, supra note
6 at 14.
245. In Switzerland, taxes are collected by the cantons in accordance with both federal
and cantonal law. Meyer, supra note 6 at 32. The cantonal laws generally and the Swiss
federal law define tax evasion as the mere non-reporting or the incomplete reporting of
income without further manipulation; i.e., the failure to declare all income on the tax return.
Id. at 33-34.
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disclosure of tax information. 246 Only in those cases involving tax fraud,
as defined in Swiss law, might the Mutual Assistance Treaty allow disclosure. 247 Most of the Cantons consider tax fraud a criminal offense,
thus annulling the bank secrecy laws and bringing the offense within the

scope of the Mutual Assistance Treaty. 248 For these reasons, the Mutual
Assistance Treaty has not been of much value in tax evasion investigations.

24 9

V. Future Information Gathering Methods
The previous discussion has considered a wide variety of information
gathering tools presently used by the U.S. tax authorities in tax evasion
investigations. The discussion indicated that the various tools were not
equally effective. Furthermore, the discussion revealed several new developments in the information gathering area, including proposals by the
U.S. tax authorities to implement new information gathering tools. Following are two information gathering methods not presently used by U.S.
tax authorities nor discussed in the previous sections, but which are likely
to be utilized in future information gathering activities.

A.

THE SWITZERLAND-UNITED STATES
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The Switzerland-United States Memorandum of Understanding 250 was
a result of SEC investigations of insider trading activities on United States
246. Honegger, supra note 6 at 7 and Meyer, supra note 6 at 33.
247. Tax fraud is generally described as overt acts, fraudulent practices, or falsification
of documents in an attempt to mislead tax authorities. This includes more than merely filing
an inaccurate tax return. Meyer, supra note 6 at 34.
248. Honegger, supra note 6 at 7 and Meyer, supra note 6 at 34.
249. GORDON REPORT, supra note 3 at 210 and Senate Hearings, supra note 2 at 27
(testimony of Richard C. Wassenaar, assistant commissioner for criminal enforcement, IRS).
Some hope remains, however, for the Mutual Assistance Treaty in tax investigations. In
the Marc Rich case the Swiss government expressly argued that the United States should
utilize the Mutual Assistance Treaty to obtain the desired information instead of trying to
coerce Marc Rich International into disclosing the information in violation of Swiss law.
Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1983, at 3, col. 2. This apparently has proven encouraging to the U.S.
tax authorities in that they are attempting to negotiate similar agreements with other countries. Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1985, at 32, col. 1.
As an outgrowth of the Mutual Assistance Treaty, Switzerland enacted the Federal Law
of Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters on Jan. 1, 1983. Honegger, supra note 6 at 9 and
Wall St. J., May 31, 1983, at 3, col. I. The law clarifies the Swiss disclosure requirements
in criminal tax investigations. It does not, however, significantly expand the disclosure
provisions, at least as far as the United States is concerned. Honegger, supra note 6 at 9.
250. Memorandum of Understanding, Aug. 31, 1982, United States-Switzerland reprinted
in Legal Times, Oct. 4, 1982, at 18, col. 3. The Memorandum of Understanding was negotiated by representatives of the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Banking
Commission, and the Swiss National Bank on the one hand and by representatives of the
SEC, Department of Justice, and State Department on the other.
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stock exchanges occurring in the fall of 1981. In Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana2 5 1 the SEC began prosecution of Banca della Svizzera Italiana (BSI), a Swiss bank, for insider
trading activities in St. Joe stock and options. The SEC attempted a variety
of discovery methods to obtain the identity of the purchasers of the stock.
BSI refused to disclose their identities claiming that disclosure would
subject it to punishment under Swiss law. 252 Finally, the court ordered
disclosure and imposed a $50,000 per day fine until the identities were
disclosed. 25 3 Before the order was issued, however, BSI obtained waivers
from its customers and identified the purchasers. 254 About the same time,
the SEC filed a complaint against "Certain Unknown Purchasers of the
Common Stock and Call Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe
International Corporation." 255 The SEC asserted violations of the insider
256
trading rules and named a number of large Swiss banks as defendants.
The court imposed a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants
from further trading violations and from disposing of the proceeds from
257
the stock transactions in question.
These cases created several significant economic problems for both
the United States and Switzerland. First, Banca della Svizzera Italiana
was the first case involving such sanctions against a bank trading in its
representative capacity, and the sanctions presented by the court were
perhaps overly harsh given the bank's lack of scienter. 258 Second, the
court's threat to block BSI's access to trading markets in the U.S. was
especially threatening to the Swiss given the temporary restraining order
imposed against several other Swiss banks only three weeks earlier by
the same court in Santa Fe International.259 The potential loss of trading
rights was of major concern to the entire Swiss banking and securities
industry. 260 Finally, the possibility of a ban on Swiss trading on U.S.
exchanges posed a major concern to U.S. investors and authorities given
the major volume of Swiss trading on those exchanges. 26 1 In this light,

251. 92 F.R.D. I11 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
252. Id. at 112-13.
253. Honegger, supra note 6 at 22.
254. Comment, Recent Developments in Insider Trading Through Swiss Bank Accounts:
An End to the "Double Standard," 5 Nw. U.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 658, 674 (1983).
255. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) para. 98,323.

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Navickas, supra note 38 at 177.
259. The decision in Santa Fe Internationalwas mandated on Oct. 26, 1981, while the
decision in Banca della Svizzera Italiana was mandated on Nov. 16, 1981.
260, Navickas, supra note 38 at 177 and Comment, supra note 254 at 659.
261. As of 1981, Switzerland accounted for approximately 20 percent of all foreign trading
in U.S. securities markets, or $14.8 million. Id.
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Switzerland and the United States held meetings in March 1983 to discuss
these issues. 26 2 The Memorandum of Understanding was the result of
263

these discussions.
The Memorandum of Understanding provides, in part, that the provisions of the Mutual Assistance Treaty 264 should be utilized to the extent
feasible 265 and that in certain circumstances insider trading could be a
266
criminal violation so that compulsory disclosure would be available.
The Memorandum of Understanding also provides, through the integrated
Private Agreement Among Members of the Swiss Bankers' Association,
that even when the investigation does not concern criminal violations of
Swiss law, disclosure might be made upon U.S. compliance with certain
26 7
standards and procedures.
The Memorandum of Understanding provides no direct authority
for Swiss disclosure of tax information to the United States, but the
fact that the Swiss agreed to disclosure without a showing of a
criminal act is significant. In that the Swiss were willing to exchange
information in the absence of criminal acts, as in the instance of
insider trading, the Swiss might be willing to exchange information
in non-criminal tax evasion investigations. 268 This fact has encouraged
the SEC to pursue negotiation of similar pacts with other countries .269
Despite the extensive network of agreements providing for bilateral
information exchanges, the United States does not have any multilateral
income tax treaties. Multilateral income tax treaties are valuable in that
information gathering and tax collection procedures are enhanced and the
exchange of information clause in the multilateral income tax treaty provides a basis for a complete sharing of information in multilateral simultaneous examinations.

262. Honegger, supra note 6 at 22 and nn. 194-96, therein.
263. Id. at 21-22; Comment, supra note 254 at 659; and Navickas, supra note 46 at 177.
264. See supra notes 240-49 and accompanying text.
265. Memorandum of Understanding, art. 11, para. 3(a) and (b), Legal Times, supra note
250 at 18, col. 1. If the investigation relates to criminal activity and the prosecuted offense
is a crime in both countries, the Mutual Assistance Treaty applies.
266. Id.
267. Honegger, supra note 6 at 23-27.
268. Certainly the United States authorities had a very considerable sanction in barring
access to U.S. stock exchanges if the Swiss failed to exchange the requested information.
This may have been a significant factor in the willingness of the Swiss to disclose the
requested information despite the non-applicability of the Mutual Assistance Treaty and the
Memorandum of Understanding. The Swiss argument that bank customers committed a
Swiss crime in their insider trading activities by giving away business secrets may have
been a way of appeasing the bank's interests in not disclosing the information. Wall St. J.,
Feb. 21, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
269. Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1985, at 32, col. I.
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At present, there are two multilateral treaties in effect dealing specifically with tax evasion. The first is the Agreement Concerning Reciprocal
Administrative Assistance in Matters of Taxation signed by the five Scandinavian countries in 1972.270 The treaty generally provides for multilateral service of documents, exchange of information, and collection of tax
liabilities. 27 1 The second multilateral tax treaty is Directive 77/799 of the
Council of the European Communities in which the Member States of the
European Economic Community agreed to exchange tax information relating to the assessment and collection of taxes. 272 The Directive applies
to all Member States 273 and provides that a Member State can refuse to
exchange information that would disclose a business secret or that would
274
violate public policy.
A multilateral treaty would offer significant benefits to the U.S. tax
authorities. First, information gathering and exchange would be facilitated
since a larger group of countries would have an identical agreement and
the countries may agree to more extensive information exchange and tax
collection procedures. Second, a multilateral agreement could provide for
mutual assistance in collecting taxes imposed by the other countries as
well as for the enforceability of the tax claims of one country in each of
the other countries. These provisions are contained in the Scandinavian
multilateral treaty. 275 Finally, a multilateral treaty would cure the inability
of the United States to share information obtained from other countries
in a multilateral simultaneous examination. This is prohibited under existing treaties. 276 Thus far, the United States has not entered into even a
firm agreement regarding the adoption of a multilateral income tax treaty.
Nonetheless, with the occurrence of negotiations on a multilateral simultaneous examination program, adoption of a multilateral income tax
treaty may occur in the not too distant future.
VI. Conclusion
The United States tax authorities have increasingly concentrated on
attacking international tax evasion activities involving tax haven coun270. Agreement Concerning Reciprocal Administrative Assistance in Matters of Taxation,
Nov. 9, 1972, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, 956 U.N.T.S. 61 (English
translation at 97) [hereinafter referred to as Scandinavian Multilateral Treaty].
271. Id.
272. Council Directive 77/799/EEC, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 336) 15 (1977).
273. Id.
274. Id. at ninth recital, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 336) at 16.
275. Scandinavian Multilateral Treaty, supra note 270 at art. 13, para. I, 956 U.N.T.S.
at 100 (English translation).
276. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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tries. The principal problem faced by the U.S. tax authorities is obtaining
information on the tax evasion activities.
The United States tax authorities have utilized several methods of gathering information on transactions in tax haven countries. Most of these
efforts have proven quite successful. Unilateral efforts of the U.S. tax
authorities have proven the most successful when specific instances of
tax evasion are suspected. The use of an administrative summons or grand
jury subpoena has proven effective when there is an entity or person
within U.S. jurisdiction who can be threatened with contempt sanctions.
The IRS' use of paid informants in tax evasion investigations has proven
highly successful, albeit highly intrusive. Because these investigations
have proven so successful, the increasing use of paid informants should
not be unexpected.
Increasing emphasis is being given to bilateral information gathering
efforts as well. The recent termination/renegotiation policy towards income tax treaties with certain countries together with the U.S. tax authorities' use of economic incentives to encourage new information exchange agreements has not yet been tested. The information exchange
provisions are, however, far more strict in requiring disclosure and so
have the potential to be very effective.
Finally, the U.S. tax authorities have utilized existing reporting requirements imposed on financial institutions to obtain information on tax
evasion. While this is a passive information gathering method, it could
prove extremely valuable in detecting the original transaction upon which
subsequent tax evasion activities are based. Increased enforcement of
IRS reporting requirements should be expected.
The U.S. tax authorities are continuing to develop new means to continue past successes. Multilateral income tax treaties and simultaneous
examination programs will likely be adopted, and further inroads into the
Swiss banking secrecy laws will likely result from the Switzerland-United
States Memorandum of Understanding.
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